THE RAGING JIHAD--AN OVERVIEW - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 162, By B. Raman, South Asia Analysis Group, 07 December 2006

Excerpt: 

SOUTHERN THAILAND

18. There is an undeclared, but unmistakable jihad going on in the three Muslim-majority provinces (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat) of Southern Thailand----which is getting bloodier and bloodier and messier and messier. The jihad in Southern Thailand has reportedly caused over 1,800 fatalities since October, 2004, as against 3,200 in India's Jammu & Kashmir during the same period.  The high rate of fatalities in J&K is due to the involvement of a large number of Pakistani mercenaries.  Hopes that the ouster of the former Prime Minister, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, who was projected by his critics as the red rag to the jihadi bull, would bring down the temperature and bloodshed have been belied so far.

19. So too hopes that the advent to power of a Muslim General ( General Sonthi Boonyaratglin) enjoying the total confidence of the highly respected Buddhist monarch and of a contrite retired General (Surayud Chulanont ) as the caretaker Prime Minister would make the terrorists more amenable to reason  have been equally belied.  Overtures by the new rulers of the country to the jihadi terrorist leaders to come to the table for talks have remained without response.

11.  The level of violence is as intense as before the fall of Mr. Shinawatra----if not more intense. Not a day passes without a terrorist attack. There were reportedly 10 deaths on December 6, 2006, alone.

12. The defining characteristics of the terrorism in Southern Thailand have more in common with what has been going on in the Indian sub-continent than in the rest of South-East Asia. Its modus operandi (MO) are more reminiscent of those followed by the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) of Bangladesh and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) of Pakistan than of Jemaah Islamia (JI). Its ideology and strong religious orthodoxy have much in common with those of the Neo Taliban.

13. Continuous and sustained violence instead of sporadic acts; avoidance of mass casualty terrorism; targeted killings of kafirs---mainly Buddhists--- as well as Muslims perceived as collaborating with the kafirs; attacks on centres of non-Muslim cultural influence such as schools; a mix of hand-held weapons and improvised explosive devices; use of two member teams in two wheelers to kill and get away; avoidance of claims; ability to operate autonomously in numerous small cells without the need for constant co-ordination by a command and control; avoidance of over-dependence on modern means of communications to reduce their vulnerability to detection by technical means etc. The HUJI in Bangladesh avoids attacks on foreigners, including foreign tourist infrastructure. So too the jihadi terrorists of Southern Thailand.

14.  The Thai authorities are still groping in the dark in their efforts to build a coherent picture of the terrorist network, its leadership and its external linkages. Intelligence flow has been weak due to difficulty in recruiting human sources from the Muslim community, inability to detect sleeper cells and capture their members for interrogation and limited flow of technical intelligence due to the terrorists' avoidance of sophisticated means of communications.

15. Investigation of committed acts of terrorism is equally weak. Successful investigations add to the data base and help in future prevention. With the investigations continuing to be poor, the data base is anything but comprehensive. Police-community relations and public co-operation are poor.

16. Pre-conceived ideas that what has been happening since 2004 is a repeat of what had happened in the 1980s and the denial mode, which inhibits a detailed investigation of possible external links either with the jihadis in other countries of South-East Asia or in the Indian sub-continent, have come in the way of adequate analysis and follow-up enquiries.

17. Questions remain unanswered or unfollowed up----why so many Thai Muslims have been going to Pakistani madrasas? Are they going legally after obtaining a no objection certificate from the Thai authorities or illegally? Do they go individually or are they being motivated by some organisation to go? Who meets their expenses? What is the background of the madrasas they join? Are they run by any of the known jihadi terrorist organisations? How many of the Thai students in the Pakistani madrasas are from Thailand and how many are from the Thai diaspora in the Gulf? What do they do after they complete their education? Why did a Pakistani newspaper report in 2005 that the decision to launch a jihad in Southern Thailand was taken at a secret meeting held by the Pattani Muslims in Pakistan etc etc. There are any number of such questions, which need to be seriously investigated.

18. If the Thai authorities won't, who will?