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News Analysis - Thailand’s Multi-Pronged Strategy in the South

This week the foreign ministers of Thailand and Malaysia met in Bangkok as part of the 10th Thai-Malaysia Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation, a mechanism that focuses on bilateral cooperation in the areas of border delineation and marking, communication, transportation, trade and investment, agriculture, science and technology, education, and energy. A top agenda item according to the Malaysian press service Bernama was the southern Thai conflict, as both sides were to explore confidence building measures. The commission is part of a larger cooperative effort called the Joint Development Strategy (JDS), which has taken on new life and increased importance as the separatist movement in Thailand’s southern provinces shows no sign of abating after more than three years of conflict and claiming upwards of 2,300 lives.

In addition to increased cooperation with Malaysia, The Thai government and military are pursuing a multi-pronged strategy that includes increasing the military’s budget for operations in the south, enhancing intelligence gathering, and a seemingly more aggressive tactical posture. According to the Bangkok Post (27 June), the armed forces have requested a special 17.6 billion Baht (554 million USD) budget as a supplemental to the normal defense budget in order to fund operations in the south. The money is to be used to underpin a four year security plan that will likely combine military operations and civil affairs/development projects. Since the Council for National Security (CNS), run by the military, and the military backed government of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont have appointed the members of the National Assembly, it is highly likely that the new budget will be passed.

Also, this week the Bangkok Post (27 June) stated that the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) Board approved measures to provide Thai security and intelligence personnel access and equipment to intercept communications in the south.  (Comment – the importance of signals intelligence (SIGINT) cannot be overemphasized, as was demonstrated in June with the capture in Indonesia of two key leaders of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization, Abu Dujana and Zarkasih. According to reports, Australian SIGINT intercepts assisted by U.S. satellites played a key role in locating them both.) Finally, this week, the Thai military detained well over 150 persons suspected of either having been involved in terrorist acts or knowing information related to attacks. This represents a significant increase in the counter-insurgency operational tempo and a shift in tactics from the past. It may indicate that while still working diplomatically and trying to engage separatist in talks, that security forces are attempting to take more decisive action against those actually planning, coordinating, and carrying out attacks.

(Comment – The insurgency in Southern Thailand continues to grow increasingly violent and complex, and so far in 2007, the rate of violent incidents in the south is the worst since the separatist movement reignited in 2004. The current Thai government has taken great strides in trying to correct missteps taken by the Thaksin administration but seem to be stymied at every turn. It now appears that they have settled on a three front strategy. The first is to deny the insurgents the ability to freely move across the border and to separate them from sympathetic supporters in the northern Malay States. Closing the border to the insurgents is an imperative task for Thai security forces. The Vietnam conflict, and more currently, the situation in Iraq are good examples of what can happen when borders remain porous and act as conduits for insurgent support.  This dovetails with Malaysian interests, as Kuala Lumpur is becoming ever more concerned that the ideology and militancy driving the Thai separatist movement will bleed over into northern Malaysia; therefore, Malaysian officials have been increasingly cooperative with the Thai government over the last six months. The second front is winning the hearts and minds of the southern population who have long been denied many of the economic benefits realized by those in other parts of Thailand. Thai officials are making efforts to expand educational opportunities, to shift from a policy of assimilation to one of recognition of the unique cultural attributes of its Islamic minority, and simultaneously increasing economic development. Finally, the security forces are going after hard core militants with greater vigor and sense of purpose. Increasing intelligence capabilities will allow the military and police to better identify and pinpoint those who are leading insurgency, and when combined with an increased operational tempo designed to disrupt and place the insurgents off balance, it is possible that they will start to see the results that they are searching for. Care must be taken, however, to retain full accountability for police and military actions, and to ensure that unchecked military operations, especially those by ill-trained paramilitary forces, do not result in gross human rights violations, unaccounted for disappearances of suspected separatists or their believed supporters, which will generating more and more insurgents in an endless upwards spiral.) [slr]