Peace in Papua: Widening a Window of Opportunity, Blair A. King, CSR NO. 14, MARCH 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Introduction and Summary of Recommendations (excerpt from document):

In 2006 and 2007, the Indonesian government and the international community have a window of opportunity to begin to achieve a comprehensive solution that is acceptable to all sides to the conflict in Papua. With the October 2004 inauguration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, Papuans had raised expectations that a comprehensive settlement could be achieved. These expectations have only increased with the implementation of a peace agreement for Aceh since August 2005. Furthermore, Yudhoyono and Kalla are not up for reelection until 2009, and their national public approval ratings remain quite high, providing them with plenty of political breathing room for reasonable initiatives.

Within Papua, conditions are also ripe for a solution. The Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP), an important component of the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy for Papua, was finally established in November 2005. Gubernatorial elections in Papua and West Irian Jaya took place in March 2006. The Papuan public has appeared willing to give the new administration the benefit of the doubt, and there remains a relative lack of separatist violence in the province.

Nonetheless, the window may be closing. Since President Yudhoyono’s inauguration, progress in fully implementing the special autonomy law has remained slow and controversy has continued over dividing Papua into two to five smaller provinces. While local governments are receiving increased funding, these institutions remain ill-prepared to handle the funds, contributing to corruption and delaying improvements in services, infrastructure, and economic benefits for Papua’s impoverished population. More troublesome are the reported augmentation of Indonesian military forces in Papua in recent months and the incidents of human rights violations that continue to go unpunished. Some Papuans are beginning to regard the current administration as no different from past administrations and are growing more frustrated by what they perceive to be a lack of respect for their legitimate concerns.

European states, Japan, Australia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, and international organizations—such as the United Nations, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank—can help push this window open, with U.S. leadership, by creating the conditions under which a meaningful dialogue between Papuans and the Indonesian government can take place. The Indonesian government and Papuans should take an integrated approach to resolving the conflict, beginning with more easily achievable objectives and working gradually toward more difficult issues in a series of confidence-building measures. Concerned states and international organizations can assist this process by quietly pressuring both parties to take a sincere and realistic approach to conflict resolution, acting as a neutral interlocutor if necessary, and marshaling an assistance package targeted toward supporting peace efforts.

This report outlines recommendations for the Indonesian government, Papuans, and other countries, particularly the United States, for moving toward a comprehensive resolution of the conflict while still addressing Aceh and other challenges. It strives for balance—rooted in an idealistic vision of peace, but with concrete recommendations for steps to take to achieve a realistic compromise.

Recommendations for the Indonesian government focus on adhering, in 2006 and 2007, to its public commitments to achieve a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Papua by:

Fully implementing special autonomy for the region;

Improving local governance and increasing transparency so that special autonomy funds improve the well-being of ordinary Papuans; and

Reforming security arrangements so that human rights abuses cease.

Recommendations for the United States and others, including European countries, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN member states, include constructive engagement and support to Indonesian conflict resolution efforts through quiet but firm diplomacy.

A package of technical and financial assistance, worth at least $50 million per year for ten years, is needed and should include support for:

Education and training for Papuans in public administration, regional planning, natural resource management, and other relevant fields;

Accountable and sustainable management of Papua’s natural resources;

Education and public health sector improvements;

Civil service, judicial, military, and police reform in Papua, building on national efforts;

Expansion of the lawmaking, budgeting, and oversight capacity of legislatures in Papua;

Enhancement of civil society’s ability to monitor, investigate, and expose human rights violations, corruption, and other abuses of power; and

Establishment of a Papua trust fund to lengthen and smooth out the flow of special autonomy funds to the region.

Failure to take advantage of the current window of opportunity will prolong the suffering of the Papuan people, rendering peaceful resolution of the conflict increasingly unlikely. The potential for conflict was vividly and tragically demonstrated as this report was going to press, with the deadly confrontations in mid-March 2006 in Timika and Jayapura. The next two years are a critical period in which the government and Papuans should embark on bold initiatives toward peace, before the 2009 presidential and legislative elections begin looming on the horizon.

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